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FIXING THE SIXTIES: SIMPLIFY GOVERNMENT AND
RESTORE HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
Philip K. Howard*
ABSTRACT
Take any frustration with overbearing or sluggish government, and ask
yourself: Who has authority to fix it? Precisely. Referring back to the 1960s
overhaul of American government, this Article argues that Washington
requires a new philosophy of governing – that human responsibility must
replace mindless rules at the point of action. Law should be reconceived as
a framework for human responsibility, not an instruction manual that strives
to supplant human judgment.
I. ATTACKING GOVERNMENT COMPLEXITY
TO ALLOW COMMON SENSE CHOICES
Americans are fed up with broken government, and want big change.
What is missing so far in this raucous election is the vital ingredient of
fundamental reform—a new vision of how to govern better. New blood in the
White House, without a new governing philosophy, is unlikely to change
much. Just as Barack Obama promised “Change We Can Believe In,” the
2016 candidates tout their personal leadership qualities. But there’s no
focus in the campaign on how to govern better. Calling for smaller
government, as all Republicans do, does not provide a mandate for how to
remake thousands of programs imbedded in old laws and thick regulations.
The Tea Party approach of “just say no” hasn’t worked—most Americans
want to fix, not eliminate, government functions. The absence of an
alternative approach to governing is a reason why the federal government
grew, not shrank, under the seven presidents—including two Democrats—
since 1968, notwithstanding their efforts to rein in government excesses.1
Why does new leadership make so little difference? Liberal reformers
tend to focus on campaign finance, gerrymandering, and other electoral
distortions. But most choices in government are paralyzed by imbedded law and
bureaucracy, not current political fights. In 2009, for example, Congress
* Philip K. Howard is senior Counsel at Covington & Burlington LLP and founder of Common
Good, a nonpartisan national coalition dedicated to restoring common sense to America.
1
See generally Reg Stats, REGULATORY STUDIES CTR, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., http://reg
ulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited May 10, 2016) (For instance, the Code of
Federal Regulations has increased from about 50,000 pages in 1968 to over 175,000 pages in 2014).

Vol. 1:1]

Fixing the Sixties

49

authorized nearly $800 billion to stimulate the economy, but no official had the
legal authority to approve new infrastructure projects.2 Red tape, not
partisanship, prevented President Obama from fixing broken bridges.3 What is
missing in modern government is the critical ingredient of a functioning
democracy: Human responsibility to get things done. Law has replaced
leadership at every level of government, from the White House to the school
house. Donald Trump won’t have a chance. He’ll say “You’re fired,” and the
bureaucrats will smile and point to their invincible civil service protections.
Take any frustration with overbearing or sluggish government, and
ask yourself: Who has authority to fix it? Precisely. Washington requires a
new philosophy of governing––human responsibility must replace mindless
rules at the point of action. Law should be reconceived as a framework for
human responsibility, not an instruction manual that strives to supplant
human judgment. The last time America overhauled its legal framework was
the 1960s. The changes in that tumultuous decade demonstrate the power of
a new governing vision. Revisiting that decade also reveals the wrong turn
that has progressively paralyzed government.
II. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
The overhaul of American government in the 1960s was driven by a
philosophical shift that redirected public priorities away from private ownership
prerogatives towards reducing harm done to minorities, consumers and the
environment. Scores of laws were written or changed that reflected this new
public philosophy that has come to be known as the “rights revolution.”4
In one short decade the rights revolution broke down ancient practices
of discrimination against minorities, women, and the disabled5; catapulted
government into regulating product and worker safety6; created consumer
rights7; and ended the ability of land owners to pollute private property and
2

See generally COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN INVESTMENT AND RECOVERY ACT FIVE YEARS LATER 3437 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_arra_report.pdf (describing
how the Recovery Act allocated stimulus funds to various infrastructure projects).
3
See Michael D. Shear, Obama Lesson: ‘Shovel Ready’ Not So Ready, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2010), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/obama-lesson-shovel-ready-not-so-ready
/?_r=1 (describing how red tape stalled Obama’s infrastructure stimulus program implementation).
4
See generally Sarah Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State,
38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 222, 22-26 (2013) (discussing the mid-twentieth century rights revolution).
5
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000 et seq.).
6
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (2012).
7
See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.).
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common resources. These shifts in goals were long overdue. The new public
narrative—expanding the vocabulary of rights to protect against any form of
power—was unstoppable. Rights put the magnifying glass on the plight of
the little guy, and posed the issue in a way that trumped the even the most
influential defenders of the status quo. Are you for hurting people?
But the governing philosophy of the rights revolution went too far:
It tried to eliminate abuses of authority not just by changing public values,
but by eliminating authority. Its new way of governing was to write rules as
precisely as possible—dictating exactly how to make a factory safe. Where
rules could not dictate the choice—as with the scope of environmental
review—the choice would be reached by consensus in drawn-out processes
or by a lawsuit. Everyone, conservatives and liberals alike, bought into the
idea of government where officials had minimal authority. Clear rules
would replace fallible human judgment. “Administrative rule-making,”
Professor Kenneth Davis pronounced, “is . . . one of the greatest inventions
of modern government.”8 Democracy would be automatic, like a modern
appliance.
Striving to dictate the most minute choices of government and
regulation, however, leads to law that is incomprehensible. Today, after 50
years of drafting to close every ambiguity with ever-more detailed rules,
officials and citizens must hack through over 100 million words of law and
regulation.9 The guiding principles of the Volcker Rule against bank
proprietary trading, promulgated as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform,
can be stated in a few paragraphs. The final rule is 950 pages.10 American
regulation has become a form of central planning. It is sometimes better than
no regulation at all, but its complexity is counterproductive and progressively
paralytic. A safe workplace mainly turns on training and factory culture, not
whether the light switch is so many inches from the door or the machinery
has the latest guard mechanism.11 Environmental review must be timely;
8

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65 (1969).
See Reg Stats, supra note 1 (The Code of Federal Regulations currently is about 175,000
pages long, which itself is over 100 million words).
10
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, VOLCKER RULE: U.S. AGENCIES APPROVE FINAL VOLCKER
RULE, DETAILING PROHIBITIONS AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO BANKING
ENTITIES WORLDWIDE (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/
SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule.pdf.
11
See, e.g., William H. Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank
Regulation as an Example, 4 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 3 (2010) (discussing the culture
of safety at Alcoa). The Kemeny Commission Report on the Three Mile Island nuclear
meltdown famously concluded that overly voluminous rules had shifted workers’ focus away
from overall safety and towards mindless compliance. The report found that “once
regulations become as voluminous and complex as those regulations . . . [in place at Three
9
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otherwise lengthy environmental review harms the environment by
prolonging bottlenecks that cause pollution.12
The 1960s philosophy of avoiding human authority had the further
baleful effect of anesthetizing America’s public culture. Public employees
are trained to mindlessly follow rules, frustrating Americans in encounters at
every level of government: “The rule made me do it.”13 Politicians also accept
laws mindlessly, as if they were the Ten Commandments and not man-made
tools which political leaders are supposed to fix when broken. President
Obama is not to blame for the infrastructure red tape that strangled the 2009
stimulus projects, but why didn’t he immediately propose a new law giving
him similar authority to FDR’s in the New Deal? Republican leaders of
Congress are not to blame for the undisciplined accretion of agency
regulations—but why don’t they do something about the undisciplined
accretion of their own statutes?
Governing without human authority, one of the pillars of the rights
revolution, was supposed to avoid abuse. Instead it exacerbated a natural
inclination by public officials to avoid responsibility. Political scientist
Samuel Huntington saw it coming. “Who governs?” is obviously an
important question, he observed. “Even more important, however, may be the
question ‘Does anybody govern?’”14
III. TOWARDS A NEW PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY:
SIMPLIFY LAW AND RESTORE RESPONSIBILITY
America’s public law must be radically simplified to require officials to
take responsibility. Democracy is supposed to empower elected officials to make
choices, not preempt their choices. Making room for human responsibility
Mile Island], they can serve as a negative factor in nuclear safety.” REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 9 (1979).
12
PHILIP K. HOWARD, TWO YEARS, NOT TEN YEARS: REDESIGNING INFRASTRUCTURE
APPROVALS 5-6, 13-15 (2015), http://commongood.3cdn.net/c613b4cfda258a5fcb_e8m6b
5t3x.pdf.
13
See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (discussing how public service workers wield much
discretion in their implementation of public programs); Robert K. Merton, Bureaucratic
Structure and Personality 18 SOCIAL FORCES 4 (1940) (“Discipline can be effective only if
the ideal patterns are buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to one’s duties,
a keen sense of the limitation of one's authority and competence, and methodical
performance of routine activities. The efficacy of social structure depends ultimately upon
infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiments.”).
14
MICHAEL J. CROZIER ET AL., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY: REPORT ON THE GOVERNABILITY
OF DEMOCRACIES TO THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION 92 (1975).
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requires radically simplifying legal codes into open frameworks of principles,
like the Constitution, instead of striving to dictate in advance every possible
choice. Some areas—for instance, pollution levels—require detailed rules. But
the goal should be the same for almost all programs: Is an identifiable human
responsible and free to act sensibly? The virtues of simplifying law are many.
Law based on general goals and principles gives flexibility for people to adapt
to the situation and make practical choices. It focuses disagreements on the
ultimate goal—right and wrong—not parsing legal language. It reinvigorates
democracy because decisions are made by people who can be held accountable,
not disembodied rules. Law can be understood by real people. As Judge Richard
Posner has observed, “[s]tandards that capture lay intuitions about right behavior
. . . may produce greater legal certainty than a network of precise . . . non-intuitive
rules . . . .”15
There’s a fear, which I will discuss, that leaving room for human
judgment will open the door for abuse. But history shows otherwise, and
demonstrates how radical legal simplification can energize a society and restore
respect to government—for example, the Uniform Commercial Code in the
1950’s, the Civil Code sponsored by Napoleon, and of course our own
Constitution.16 The task is not as daunting as you might imagine, because
restoring human responsibility obviates the need for 95 percent of the
legal detail. Experience shows it is best implemented by delegating
responsibility to a small committee of respected citizens, such as the Simpson
Bowles committee or base-closing commissions. Then Congress can vote it up
or down.
In the 1980s Australia replaced a thousand rules for nursing homes
with 31 general principles: for example, to provide a “homelike environment”
and “[respecting] [t]he dignity of residents.”17 Within a year, nursing homes
were markedly better.18 Regulators didn’t give up their power; arguably they
had more authority. But disagreements now focused on the quality of care,
not compliance with nitpicking rules.
15

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990).
See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND
BROKEN GOVERNMENT 147-49 (2014) (discussing the value of recodification efforts through
history). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 377–
98 (2002) (discussing the development of the Uniform Commercial Code); Jean Louis
Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1074-75
(1988) (discussing the Napoleonic Code).
17
See John Braithwaite &Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus
Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 307, 313-16 (1995) (detailing
reforms in nursing home regulation in light of a series of scandals).
18
Id.
16
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This is the way many laws used to be written before the 1960s—law
provided a framework for responsibility, not an instruction manual. The 1956
statute authorizing the interstate highway system, for example, was 29 pages
long.19 By 1970, about 30,000 miles of highway had been constructed.20 Today
it would take almost that long to get permits. The brevity of law that sets goals
and lines of authority will surprise people. A recent legislative proposal by
Common Good to streamline infrastructure approvals from ten years to two
years, for example, is less than three pages long: it allocates authority to
environmental officials to decide when there’s been sufficient review, and
expedites judicial review.21
Reinstating human responsibility to implement public decisions doesn’t
guarantee good decisions, but it makes them possible and creates the conditions
for accountability when they’re not. A leaderless legal process, by contrast, just
ends up being a mosh pit at the government spigot—where self-interest is
justified by contortions of legal language, and almost no one talks about what is
right. The upshot of this legalistic culture is that the values of Washington are no
longer confluent with those of the rest of society. This is the definition of a
deviant subculture.22
An overhaul of historic proportions is needed. Just as the shift in
public philosophy in the 1960s had a clear approach, focusing on individual
rights, so too simplifying American public law should have a clear standard
by which all regulatory choices can be judged: What is the right thing to do
here?
IV. DISCARDING THE PHILOSOPHY OF DISTRUST
Distrust is the mortar that keeps the massive bureaucratic edifice in place.
What if the environmental official is corrupt, inept or has ulterior motives?
Giving officials authority to make choices is a terrifying prospect to most people.
The rational answer is that, even with the authority to decide, the official still has
to comply with laws, and is accountable to higher officials for his judgment, and
to courts for legal compliance. The evidence overwhelmingly favors more
responsibility. People taking responsibility are the secret sauce of any school or
19

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (1956).
WENDELL COX & JEAN LOVE, THE BEST INVESTMENT A NATION EVER MADE 4 (1996),
available at http://www.publicpurpose.com/freewaypdf.pdf.
21
COMMON GOOD, POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO TITLE XXXI, SUBTITLE A—ACCELERATING
PROJECT DELIVERY OF THE DRIVE ACT, TO SIMPLIFY AND STREAMLINE INFRASTRUCTURE
REVIEW AND PERMITTING, http://commongood.3cdn.net/70cb063afe28bfd79f_vnm6b5jj6.pdf.
22
See HOWARD supra note 16, at 137-42.
20
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public department that works well.23 Official abuse is also best deterred, studies
repeatedly conclude, by shining the spotlight on responsible people.24
Still, there is an instinctive revulsion to the idea of giving people in
government any amount of authority. No matter how many checks and
balances. The siren song of what is called “clear law” entices even the best
minds. Conservative economist Friedrich Hayek wrote early in his career that
“government in all its actions . . . [should be] bound by rules fixed and
announced beforehand.”25 Liberal legal philosopher Joseph Raz advocates the
“use [of] rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior” because
they “lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.”26
On the other hand, Aristotle observed that the need to adjust for
the circumstances means that “it is impossible that all things should be precisely
set down in writing.”27 “Justice . . . is a concept by far more subtle and indefinite,”
Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, than “is yielded by mere obedience to a
rule.”28 Judgment on the spot, not any legal or rationalist directive, is required to
get anything done. Historian Jacques Barzun put it this way: “No scientist has
chosen a spouse or bought a house using scientific methods.”29 The future of good
government hinges on this debate, and not for the first time. The tension between
legal precision and human responsibility was the main fight in the constitutional
debates. The anti-federalists wanted detailed limitations on state power.30 James
23

See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA 64-65 (2011) (highlighting Sam Schwartz’s innovation in fixing Brooklyn’s
Carroll Street Bridge); PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: RESTORING
RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 93-121 (2010) (discussing the correlation between teacher
autonomy and classroom success). See also PASI SAHLBERG, FINNISH LESSONS: WHAT CAN
THE WORLD LEARN FROM EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN FINLAND? (2011) (discussing the
extremely decentralized Finnish education system).
24
See, e.g., STATE-CITY COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO CITY PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACTS (1986) (showing
how New York’s unwieldy and complex implementation of public contracting operations
invited corruption). See generally FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT
OF ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE
(1996) (increasingly complicated mechanisms to combat corruption undermine governance).
25
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75 (1944).
26
Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972).
27
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 81 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Thrift ed. 2000).
28
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 87 (1924).
29
JACQUES BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 162 (1983).
30
See, e.g., THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 81 (Brutus) (“I showed, that the judicial
power of the United States under the first clause of the second section of article eight, would
be authorized [sic] to explain the constitution, not only according to its letter, but according
to its spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such
a construction as to extend the powers of the general government, as much as possible, to the
diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states.”).
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Madison argued in rebuttal that the first goal was to provide “powers [that] were
necessary means of attaining . . . necessary ends,” and not to agonize over “the
possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust.”31
George Washington similarly wrote that “no government can be well
administered without powers,” and chastised opponents who fixate on
immediate abuses and imagine official as “tyrants . . . [with] no other
disposition but to oppress.”32 In the end, Washington concluded:
No man is a warmer advocate for proper restraints and
wholesome checks in every department of government than I
am; but I have never yet been able to discover the propriety of
placing it absolutely out of the power of men to render essential
Services, because a possibility remains of their doing ill.33
Life is too complex to dictate decisions in advance, especially in this
century. A fast-paced interdependent world requires more, not less, public
oversight to safeguard common resources and protect against hidden risks.
The more complex the world, however, the simpler law must be: “The
simpler, the better” according to complexity theorist Nicholas Taleb.34
People must feel free to act on what they understand to be social norms of
right and wrong, and then be accountable, not get bogged down in intricate
regulatory schemes they can barely understand. At the end of his life, Hayek
recanted his earlier views of mechanical law, saying that he had
reconsidered “the supposed greater certainty . . . [when] all rules of law
have been laid down in written and codified form.”35 Ultimately law is more
predictable when decisions are not made by “the letter of the law,” but “by
generally held views of what is just.”36
The best indictment of “clear law” is what it has wrought—a dense
bureaucratic jungle that is progressively paralyzing daily choices in
government and society. The dream of automatic government has
undeniable appeal: we hoped to avoid bad judgment by avoiding all
judgment. It just does not work. Americans’ frustration with Washington
has reached a boiling point. It is time to look at broken government with
31

THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
Letter from George Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. 9, 1787) (reproduced at
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-bushrod-washington-2/).
33
Id.
34
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 11 (2012).
35
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES AND ORDER
116 (1973).
36
Id.
32
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clear eyes, and acknowledge the flaw in philosophy that has prevented any
recent president from fixing it. “[U]nless government is first effective,”
management theorist Peter Drucker concluded, “all the more ambitious
goals will remain mere rhetoric . . .”37
Ask again: Who today has authority to fix any problem? Simplifying
legal codes, history shows, can transform society—like replacing a muddy
road with a paved highway. The benefits here may be exponential, because
the new codes will release human energy that for 50 years has been actively
repressed by an anti-human legal philosophy. Fixing broken government
requires a historic overhaul. The new governing philosophy, however, could
hardly be more traditional: to reactivate the role of human responsibility in
democratic governance.

37

Peter F. Drucker, Individual Freedom and Effective Government in a Society of Superpowers, in POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (William V. D’Antonio & Howard J.
Ehrlich eds., 1961).

